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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the claim, by the Department of Commerce, that a portfolio of Baldrige 
National Quality Award winners outperforms the market.  They find that there is a 92 percent re-
turn for Baldrige winners as compared to a 33 percent return on the S&P 500 index.  Their results 
are published and used to promote “quality” in Department of Commerce press releases.  Our 
findings do not support their claim that investors can handsomely outperform the market by in-
vesting in a Baldrige portfolio.  We find that their study is sensitive to risk measurement and that 
extending the time horizon alone eliminates any advantage.  Our examination of long-run stock 
price performance of Baldrige firms also does not support their claim of outperforming the mar-
ket. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 perennial
1
 question in industry is whether there is a financial return to firms that invest in total quali-
ty.  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the agency in the Department of 
Commerce which administers the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award, has provided studies 
that attempt to measure the stock return for Baldrige award winning firms.  The methodology em-
ployed by NIST is to measure a hypothetical investment of $1,000, invested in each publicly traded firm that won the 
Baldrige Award, on the first business day in April of the year in which the firm won the award.  NIST finds that there 
is a 92 percent return for Baldrige winners as compared to a 33 percent return on the S&P 500 index. 
 
 The results of the NIST study are published and used to promote “quality” in Department of Commerce 
press releases.  The Department claims that the “Baldrige Index is a winner” and that their “study demonstrates that a 
quality approach to running a business can be financially profitable.” However, originally NIST was created to pro-
mote U.S. economic growth by working with industry to develop and apply technology, measurements and stan-
dards.  
 
The purpose of this study is to provide a detailed examination of the long-run stock price performance of 
Baldrige winners surrounding their award announcements.   This study contributes to both quality management and 
market efficiency literature by providing insight on whether investors can outperform the market by investing in a 
portfolio of Baldrige winners (Baldrige Portfolio) following their award announcements.  Additionally, this paper 
contributes to the literature that has employed financial analysis to study firm performance with regard to manage-
ment techniques.  For instance, Bannister (1990) and Clayman (1987) investigated the “In Search of Excellence” 
phenomenon, while Kleiman (1999) investigated Economic Value Added (EVA). 
 
The paper is organized as follows: we first describe the data sample followed by a section on research de-
sign and results in two phases.  First, in Phase I, we replicate and extend the time horizon of the NIST 
__________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
                                                     
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the Southern Finance Association and the Eastern Finance Associa-
tion respectively.   
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portfolio and compare the results with different benchmark measures of performance.  Second, in Phase II we ex-
amine the long-run stock performance of Baldrige firms, both preceding and following their award announcements.  
The final section provides conclusions. 
 
Sample 
 
 We identified the population of Baldrige winners from the website of National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) at www.quality.nist.gov/docs/winners.  There were 31 Baldrige awards over the ten-year period 
of 1988 through 1997.  A list of the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award winners is presented in Table 1.  Ten 
of the Baldrige winners are privately held companies, and hence they are excluded from our analysis.  There are 21 
Baldrige awards in our final sample. 
 
Research Design and Results 
 
 The analysis of this study is composed of two phases.  The first phase is basically a replication and an ex-
pansion of the NIST study.  In other words, we examine the percentage changes in the stock prices of Baldrige win-
ners following their award announcements.  The second phase is to examine the long-run risk-adjusted stock price 
performance of the portfolio of Baldrige winners surrounding their award announcements. 
 
Phase I 
 
This phase is composed of two parts.  First, we replicate the NIST study by following its methodology and 
using public winning companies over the period of 1988 through 1994.  We compute the percentage changes in the 
stock prices of the Baldrige winners from the first business day in April of the year they won the award (or the date 
they went public) to October 3, 1994.  Adjustments are made for stock splits and/or stock dividends.  For compari-
son, we pair up each Baldrige winner with the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 index and compute the percentage 
change in the index over the holding horizon corresponding to that of the Baldrige winner. 
 
Our findings, presented in column A of Table 2, in general, confirm the findings of the NIST study.  The 
average percentage changes in stock prices for the Baldrige winners and the S&P 500 index are, respectively, 99.4% 
and 57.4%.  Although our results show a smaller margin, the conclusion is qualitatively identical to that of the NIST, 
which documented an average percentage change in the S&P 500 index of 32.6%.  In other words, when the S&P 
500 index is used as the benchmark, the Baldrige winners outperform the market.  One of our concerns about the re-
search design of the NIST study is their lack of control for risk.  In order to investigate our concern, we also replicate 
their study with the NASDAQ index, in place of the S&P 500 index, as the benchmark because some of the winning 
companies are listed on the NASDAQ.  The result of this investigation indicates that the margin of the Baldrige win-
ners over the market vanishes.  The average percentage change in the NASDAQ index over the holding horizons cor-
responding to those of the Baldrige winners is 95.4%, which is only 4% lower than that of the Baldrige award win-
ners.  This shows that the relative performance of the Baldrige winners is highly sensitive to the choice of the 
benchmark index, suggesting that the results and conclusions of the NIST study are subject to risk mismeasurement. 
 
 The second part of Phase I expands the first part by examining Baldrige award winners over the period of 
1988 through 1997.  We follow the same methodology except extending the holding horizon to July 1, 1998.  The 
results of this analysis, which are presented in column B of Table 2, further question the claim of the NIST study that 
the Baldrige winners outperform the market.  In this expanded analysis, the average percentage change in stock pric-
es for Baldrige winners, the S&P 500 index and the NASDAQ index are, respectively, 208.9%, 349.6% and 423.7%.  
These findings suggest that Baldrige winners fail to outperform the market, even when a more conservative S&P 500 
index is used as the benchmark. 
 
 The inclusion of the NASDAQ index in Phase I of our analysis sheds some light on the importance of con-
trolling for risk in the analysis.  However, we have not explicitly controlled for the riskiness of the Baldrige winners 
in our Phase I analysis.  In addition, all Baldrige winners share the same ending date, however, they may have differ-
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                           Volume 1, Number 4 
 9 
ent beginning dates in the computation of the percentage change in stock price; therefore, the methodology used by 
NIST, as well as in Phase I of this study, allows different Baldrige winners to have different holding horizons.  This 
makes the interpretation of the average percentage change in stock prices of Baldrige winners less intuitive.  In re-
sponse to these concerns, we develop the second phase of our analysis. 
 
Phase II 
 
 Kothari and Warner (1997) show that there are biases in measuring long-run excess returns according to the 
CAPM and the traditional market model.  In addition, Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that the use of the common in-
dex as the benchmark portfolio in measuring long-run excess returns will lead to misspecified test statistics.  In the 
same study, Barber and Lyon show that matching sample firms by similar size and book-to-market ratios yields well-
specified measures of long-run excess returns.  Besides, Fama and French (1992) find that both the firm size and 
market-to-book ratio are better risk measures than stock beta in explaining cross-sectional stock returns.  Thus, we 
construct control firm portfolios for the Baldrige award winners by matching the industry, defined according to the 
4-digit SIC code, and the firm size or the market-to-book ratio of Baldrige winners at the fiscal year end preceding 
their award announcements.  In Phase II of this study, three control firm portfolios are constructed as the benchmark 
for detecting risk-adjusted abnormal holding period returns (AHPR) of the Baldrige winners.  Two of them are in-
dustry and firm size matched.  We use market value of equity (MVE) and book value of total assets (TA) as proxies 
for firm size.  The third control firm portfolio is matched by industry and the market-to-book ratio (MB).  The firm 
size or the market-to-book ratio of the control firm is within 50% to 150% of the value of the corresponding variable 
for the Baldrige winner.  Following the suggestion of Canina, Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1998), we use 
monthly returns to avoid potential upward biases associated with compounded daily returns in measuring returns of 
the portfolios over an extended horizon. 
 
 In order to gain a full picture of the market performance of Baldrige winners, we examine their long-run 
stock price performance both preceding and following their award announcements.   We examine the abnormal hold-
ing period returns (AHPRs) of Baldrige winners over 12-month, 24-month and 36-month holding horizons surround-
ing their award announcements.  In other words, the post-award analysis includes the (+1,+12), (+1,+24) and 
(+1,+36) horizons while the pre-award analysis includes the (-12,-1), (-24,   -1) and (-36,-1) horizons, where the 
event month t is defined as the calendar month relative to the announcement month (t = +1).  In this phase, we lost 
another observation because two divisions of AT&T won the awards in the same year (1992).  We also lost one ob-
servation due to no data available for Zytec, a Baldrige winner in 1991 on COMPUSTAT.  As a result, our final 
sample for Phase II has 19 observations. 
 
Conrad and Kaul (1993) show that cumulative abnormal returns that are computed according to a rebalanc-
ing strategy tend to overstate the true abnormal returns.  This upward bias increases with the number of periods ac-
cumulated.  In addition, Barber and Lyon (1997) recommend that long-run abnormal returns should be calculated as 
the long-run buy-and-hold return of a sample firm less the long-run buy-and-hold return of an appropriate benchmark 
of matching firms.  In order to reduce the potential biases in measuring long-run abnormal returns, we follow a buy 
and hold strategy in computing holding period returns for both the Baldrige winners and their control firms.  For the 
Baldrige winners, the L-month holding period return for winner j, HPRjL, is defined as: 
 
HPRjL  =   (1+Rjt) -1  
 
where  L is the length of the holding period, which has a value of 12, 24 or 36, respectively, for both the pre-award 
and post-award analyses, and 
 
Rjt is the monthly rate of return on stock j for event month t relative to the announcement month (t = +1). 
 
If the Baldrige winner stops trading at any time prior to the end of the holding period, its return for the rest 
of the holding period is assumed to be equal to the return of the respective control firm to avoid survival biases in the 
analysis. 
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 We compute the L-month holding period return for the control firm in a similar fashion.  In other words, Rjt 
in the above equation is replaced by the monthly rate of return on the respective control firm, C, for event month t in 
computing the L-month holding period return for the control firm, HPRcL.  Then we compute the abnormal holding 
period return by subtracting the holding period return of the respective control firm from that of the Baldrige winner 
over the corresponding holding horizon.  In other words, the L-month abnormal holding period return for firm j with 
control firm C, AHPRjcL, is defined as: 
 
AHPRjcL = HPRjL - HPRcL  
 
The long-run risk-adjusted stock price performance of the Baldrige winners is measured by the sample 
means and medians of the abnormal holding period returns (AHPR) over various holding horizons surrounding their 
award announcements. 
 
The results of Phase II of our analysis are presented in Table 3.  First, we observe that in comparing the re-
sults across columns, the AHPRs generally vary with the choice of benchmarks.  For a given time period the signs 
and magnitude vary with the control firms.  Second, there are signs that the Baldrige winners perform better than the 
control firms during the 12-month period immediately preceding (-12,-1) the award announcement.  The AHPRs are 
largest and the signs are consistently positive across various control firms.  This result cannot be attributed to public 
information prior to the award announcement, since applications for the award and site visits are kept confidential. It 
is also interesting to note that, during the 12-month period immediately following their award announcements, the 
Baldrige winners seem to perform worse than their control firms. Finally, the results are not statistically significant, 
and they appear to be driven by a few outliers in the sample, especially for the sample mean statistics.  This is a 
common problem that is found with small samples with substantial dispersion. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
In general, our findings do not support the claim of NIST that investors can handsomely outperform the 
market by investing in a portfolio of Baldrige award winners.  In Phase I, we find that a Baldrige Portfolio has a 
holding period return of 99%, as compared to the S&P 500 index of 57%.  This finding, which replicates the NIST 
study, supports their claim that the Baldrige Portfolio outperforms the market over the period from 1988 through 
1994.  However, risk is not explicitly taken into account.  When we add the NASDAQ index, we find the holding pe-
riod return is 95%, which is only 4% lower than that of the Baldrige Portfolio.  This result indicates that the margin 
of the Baldrige Portfolio is highly sensitive to the choice of the benchmark, suggesting that the results and conclu-
sions of the NIST study are subject to risk mismeasurement. 
 
Additionally, in Phase I, we extend the holding period horizon to cover the period 1988 through 1997 and 
follow the same methodology.  The results of this analysis further question the claim of the NIST study that the Bal-
drige Portfolio outperforms the market.  In this expanded analysis, the holding period returns for the Baldrige Portfo-
lio, the S&P 500 index, and the NASDAQ index are, respectively, 209%, 350% and 424%.  These findings suggest 
that the Baldrige Portfolio fails to outperform the market, even when a more conservative S&P500 index is used as 
the benchmark. 
 
In Phase II, we examine abnormal holding period returns of the Baldrige winners over 12-month, 24-month 
and 36-month holding horizons surrounding their award announcements.  Three control firm portfolios are con-
structed as the benchmark for detecting risk adjusted AHPRs of the Baldrige winners.  Among our findings is that the 
AHPRs are sensitive to the benchmark control firm portfolios.  There are results that suggest that Baldrige winners 
perform better than the control firms during the 12-month period preceding the award and experience stock price un-
derperformance in the 12-month period after the award.  The 12-month period prior to the award is not influenced by 
public information, since applications for the award and site visits are kept confidential.  Finally, the results are not 
statistically significant, and they appear to be driven by a few outliers in the sample, which is a common problem 
with small samples with substantial dispersion. 
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Overall, our results do not support the claim of NIST that investors can outperform the market by investing 
in a portfolio of Baldrige award winners.  Furthermore, a department of the federal government is poorly advised in 
taking an advocacy position regarding portfolios for investors, and apparently they are poorly equipped in the analyt-
ical techniques to engage in portfolio research.  The NIST study implies that “quality pays.”  We believe that it is 
more appropriate to confine the findings solely to implications regarding Baldrige award winners, and that a Baldrige 
Portfolio does not apparently outperform the market.  Our results do not necessarily carry implications regarding 
quality management or whether “quality pays,” other than for firms that win the Baldrige award.    
 
 
Table 1.  A List of the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award Winners: 1988 to 1997 
 
      Award  Firm 
 Company Name     Year    Status  Market Value  
 
Globe Metallurgical Inc.    1988  Private   
Motorola Inc.     1988  Public  $ 6,432 MM 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation   1988  Public  $ 7,141 MM 
-- Commerical Nuclear Fuel Division 
Milliken & Company    1989  Private 
Xerox Corporation     1989  Public  $ 6,004 MM 
-- Business Products & Systems 
General Motors Company    1990  Public  $ 25,590 MM 
-- Cadillac Motor Car Company 
Federal Express Corporation    1990  Public  $ 2,461 MM 
IBM       1990  Public  $ 54,093 MM 
-- AS/400 Division 
Wallace Co., Inc.     1990  Private 
Marlow Industries, Inc.    1991  Private 
Solectron Corporation    1991  Public  $       68 MM 
Zytec Corporation     1991  Public  NO DATA 
AT&T Network Systems Group   1992  Public  $ 51,228 MM 
-- Transmission Systems Business Unit 
AT&T      1992  Public  $ 51,228 MM 
-- Universal Card Services 
Granite Rock Company    1992  Private 
The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company   1992  Private 
Texas Instruments Inc.    1992  Public  $ 2,525 MM 
-- Defense Systems & Electronics Group 
Ames Rubber Corporation     1993  Private 
Eastman Chemical Company    1993  Public  $ 3,924 MM 
AT&T      1994  Public  $ 71,000 MM 
-- Consumer Communications Services 
GTE Directories Corporation    1994  Public  $ 33,311 MM 
Wainwright Industries, Inc.    1994  Private 
Armstrong World Industries    1995  Public  $ 1,435 MM 
-- Building Products Operations 
Corning Telecommunications    1995  Public  $ 6,817 MM 
-- Products Division 
ADAC Laboratories    1996  Public  $     203 MM 
Custom Research, Inc.    1996  Private 
Dana Commercial Credit Corporation   1996  Public  $ 2,969 MM 
Trident Precision Manufacturing, Inc.   1996  Private 
Merrill Lynch & Company    1997  Public  $ 13,373 MM 
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company  1997  Public  $ 34,597 MM 
Solectron Corporation    1997  Public  $   1,962 MM 
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Table 2 
Raw Stock Price Performance of Malcolm Baldrige Award Winners: 
A Replication and Expansion of the NIST’s Study 
 
             Column A – Replication     
Column B Expansion_  
            (Closing on 10/3/1994)     
(Closing on 7/1/1998) 
    Investment Purchase   Sale  Percentage      
Sale  Percentage 
Company Name              Date        Price        Price  Return (%)     
Price  Return (%) 
Motorola Inc.      4/4/1988 $ 11.125  $ 52.625    373.0  
 $ 52.9375    375.8 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation    4/4/1988 $ 25.5625 $ 12.875    (49.6)  
 $ 28.3025      10.8 
Xerox Corporation      4/3/1989 $ 60.25  $106.00    75.9  
 $103.4376    415.6 
General Motors Company     4/2/1990 $ 45.50  $  46.25       1.6  
 $  68.50       50.5 
Federal Express Corporation     4/2/1990 $ 55.375  $  61.25     10.6  
 $  62.9375      13.7 
IBM        4/2/1990 $105.875  $  68.875   (34.9)  
 $116.75     120.5 
Solectron Corporation     4/1/1991 $   4.1875 $  26.25   526.9  
 $  44.00  2,001.5 
Zytec Corporation    11/11/1993 $ 10.375  $  11.25       8.4  
 NO DATA 
AT&T Network Systems Group    4/1/1992 $ 40.375  $  53.375     32.2  
 $  56.75       40.6 
AT&T Universal Card Services    4/1/1992 $ 40.375  $  53.375     32.2  
 $  56.75       40.6 
Texas Instruments Inc.     4/1/1992 $ 32.00  $  66.125   106.8  
 $  60.00     650.0 
Eastman Chemical Company     1/4/1994 $ 45.25  $  53.625     18.5  
 $  61.375      36.0 
AT&T       4/4/1994 $ 51.00      
 $  56.75       11.3 
GTE Directories Corporation     4/4/1994 $ 30.75      
 $  56.25       82.9 
Armstrong World Industries     4/3/1995 $ 45.50      
 $  67.9375      49.3 
Corning Telecommunications     4/3/1995 $ 36.00      
 $  34.875     (3.1) 
ADAC Laboratories     4/1/1996 $ 17.375      
 $  22.125      27.5 
Dana Commercial Credit Corporation    4/1/1996 $ 33.50      
 $  54.4375      62.5 
Merrill Lynch & Company        4/1/1997 $ 43.75      
 $  96.125    119.7 
Award Winners’ Portfolio Average Percentage Return     99.4%   
  208.9% 
Standard & Poor’s 500 Index Average Percentage Return    57.4%   
  349.6% 
NASDAQ’s Composite Index Average Percentage Return    95.4%   
  423.7%  
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Table 3 
Long Term Abnormal Holding Period Returns (AHPR) of Baldrige Winners Surrounding Their Award Announcements 
 
Benchmark Variable: A.  Market-to-Book Ratio       B.  Market Value of Equity     C. Total Assets 
 
Holding  Cum. 
Period Return      N    Median Mean  N   Median Mean  N   Median Mean 
(-36, -1) 1.4425  19 -0.0087 -0.0735  19 -0.0256  0.0165  19  0.0282 0.0834 
(-24, -1) 1.3217  19 -0.0408 -0.1664  19  0.0331  0.0402  19 -0.0060 0.0139 
(-12, -1) 1.2023  19  0.2092  0.1311  19  0.1197  0.1229  19  0.0886 0.0376 
(+1, +12) 1.2091  16 -0.0508  0.0188  16 -0.0110  0.0546  16 -0.0170 0.0443 
(+1, +24) 1.6296  14  0.1455  0.1334  14 -0.0348  0.1868  14 -0.0501 0.1508 
(+1, +36) 1.8691  12  0.1458  0.4490  12  0.2114  0.4162  12 -0.0618 0.4548 
 
Notes: 
t = +1:  The award announcement month. 
Cum. Return: The raw cumulative holding period returns of the Baldrige winners over the various holding pe-
riods. 
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